

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1016 IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

USLO PEKING

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 8211

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, JA, CH, XC, KN, KS

SUBJ: DIET DEBATES FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND JAPANESE SECURITY
PART I

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED.

SUMMARY. A SIGNIFICANT DIET DEBATE CONCERNING JAPAN'S SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF THE COLLAPSE OF INDOCHINA HAS EXTENDED OVER FOUR DAYS, JUNE 9-12, IN THE IMPORTANT BUDGET COMMITTEES, AND IT NOW CONTINUES IN OTHER COMMITTEE SESSIONS. THE PRIMIN, FONMIN AND DEFENSE AGENCY DIRGEN HAVE COMMENTED ON FIVE IMPORTANT AREAS: (1) SOUTHEAST ASIA; (2) KOREA, JAPANESE SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIAL

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THE U.N. COMMAND; (3) THE HEGEMONY ISSUE IN JAPAN-PRC RELATIONS; (4) PRIOR CONSULTATIONS AND THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP; AND (5) U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE SHARING. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION TO DATE (THEMES 1, 2

AND 3). SEPTELS COVER THE SECURITY THEMES (4 AND 5). END SUM.

1. AS A CONDITION OF EXTENDING THE DIET BY 40 DAYS, OPPOSITION PARTIES INSISTED THAT THERE BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEBATE THE EFFECT OF RECENT EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON JAPANESE SECURITY. IT WAS FINALLY AGREED THAT THE DEBATE WOULD TAKE PLACE FOR TWO DAYS EACH IN THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEES, WHERE ALL CABINET MEMBERS ARE REQUIRED TO ATTEND. THESE EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEES, WHICH TOOK PLACE JUNE 9-12, HAD NOT BEEN HELD IN SEVEN YEARS AND PROVIDED THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENSIVE QUESTIONING OF CABINET MEMBERS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE SECURITY OF THE COLLAPSE IN INDOCHINA. THE QUESTIONING AND RESPONSES FELL INTO FIVE GENERAL CATEGORIES: (1) THE MEANING OF EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, (2) THE RELATIONSHIP OF KOREA TO JAPANESE SECURITY AND PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE U.N. COMMAND, (3) THE HEGEMONY ISSUE IN ON-GOING JAPAN-CHINA NEGOTIATIONS, (4) CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO U.S. FORCES' USE OF BASES IN JAPAN AND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND (5) JOINT U.S.- JAPAN DEFENSE SHARING JOINT PLANNING. A NUMBER OF THESE THEMES HAVE BEEN CARRIED FORWARD IN SUBSEQUENT INTERPELLATIONS IN OTHER DIET COMMITTEES ON JUNE 13 AND 16; THE SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONS ARE ALSO INCLUDED. BECAUSE OF THE DURATION OF THE INTERPELLATIONS -- MORE THAN FIFTY HOURS SO FAR AND CONTINUING -- THIS MESSAGE COVERS ONLY THE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, KOREA AND THE CHINA-RELATED HEGEMONY MATTER (THEMES 1,2 AND 3). THE SECURITY RELATED THEMES (4 AND 5) ARE COVERED IN SEPTELS. ALL OF THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION PARTY QUESTIONS.

2. SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE PRIMIN SAID THAT RECENT EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDERSCORED TWO PRINCIPLES: THAT PEACE AND STABILITY ARE IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS THE WILL OF A NATION AND ITS NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION ARE RESPECTED; AND BOTH SELF-HELP EFFORTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ARE NECESSARY. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, THE PRIMIN SAID, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PRINCIPLES. IN A LENGTHY EX-CONFIDENTIAL

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CHANGE, THE PRIMIN STATED THE U.S. HAD "INTERVENED" IN SOUTH VIETNAM AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVT. QUESTIONED ABOUT U.S. MOTIVES IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA, THE FONMIN STATED THAT THE U.S., CONCERNED OVER IDEOLOGY, CAME TO THE AID OF SOUTH VIETNAM, BUT THAT U.S. MOTIVES IN CAMBODIA WERE "NOT CLEAR". CONCERNING THE FATE OF VIETNAMESE STUDENTS NOW IN JAPAN, BOTH THE FONMIN AND THE EDUCATION MINISTER SAID THE STUDENTS CAN STAY ON IN JAPAN EVEN IF THEIR VISAS EXPIRE.

3. KOREA. IN HIS OPENING RESPONSE, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT MOVES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAVE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN AND IT IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE PEACE AND

STABILITY THERE TO PREVENT AN ARMED CLASH AND TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WHICH WILL PROMOTE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION. COMMENTING ON THE 1969 SATO-NIXON COMMUNIQUE, THE PRIMIN SAID, REGARDLESS OF THE COMMUNIQUE, "PEACE IN SOUTH KOREA AND IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS ESSENTIAL TO JAPANESE SECURITY." DISCUSSING THE SATO COMMUNIQUE, THE FONMIN NOTED THAT SATO'S 1969 PRESS CLUB REMARKS WERE LATER DESCRIBED IN A DIET SESSION BY SATO HIMSELF AS INAPPROPRIATE (SATO'S NOVEMBER 11, 1971 REMARKS BEING SENT SEPTTEL) BUT, THE FONMIN SAID, THE COMMUNIQUE REMAINS.

4. AS FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE FONMIN SAID THAT TENSION HAS INCREASED SINCE THE 1972 PROPOSAL OF NORTH/SOUTH TALKS. AFTER REFUSING TO COMMENT ON ROK DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, HE ADDED THAT SOME U.S. CONGRESSMEN WERE CONCERNED ABOUT IT.

5. URGED TO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA IMMEDIATELY, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT IT WAS THE JAPANESE INTENTION TO DEEPEN CONTACTS BY STAGES; HE PROMISED TO STUDY FURTHER THE POSSIBILITY OF AN (OFT-POSTPONED) NORTH KOREA VISIT BY AN LDP COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR NORTH KOREAN AFFAIRS. AS FOR AID TO SOUTH KOREA, THE FONMIN SAID THE CURRENTLY SCHEDULED Y23.4 BILLION WAS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND NO VALUE JUDGEMENT AS TO DOMESTIC POLITICS WAS IMPLIED.

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6. SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE U.N. COMMAND. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING, THE FONMIN SAID THERE WAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF DISBANDING U.N. FORCES IN KOREA AT THIS FALL'S U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION. ASKED ABOUT JAPAN'S POSITION ON THE ISSUE, HE SAID CONSULTATIONS MUST BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE REACHING A DECISION, BUT THAT DISBANDING U.N. FORCES MIGHT ALSO MEAN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WOULD LOSE VALIDITY. IF SO, THE FONMIN SAID, "THE CONFLICT CANNOT BE SETTLED." A SPECIALIST COMMENTED THAT IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER DISBANDING U.N. FORCES WOULD END THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, BUT THE "RESOLUTION ON CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL" WOULD CERTAINLY TERMINATE. PRESSED FURTHER, THE FONMIN SAID JAPAN WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF U.N. FORCES DISBANDING AND THE POSS-
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IBILITIES OF SIMULTANEOUS U.N. ENTRY AND/OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. BUT BOTH LATTER CONCEPTS WERE OPPOSED BY THE NORTH BECAUSE IT WOULD SOLIDIFY THE DIVISION (OF KOREA). THE FONMIN LATER SAID JAPAN WAS NOT OPPOSED TO DISBANDING THE U.N. COMMAND, BUT WOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. THE PRIMIN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SIMULTANEOUS U.N. ADMISSION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, BUT NOT IF IT WERE TO SOLIDIFY THE DIVISION OF KOREA. THE FONMIN DESCRIBED THE CONCEPT OF A NON-AGRESSION TREATY GUARANTEED BY THE FOUR POWERS (U.S., USSR, PRC, JAPAN) IN SIMILAR FASHION. IN A RELATED REMARK, THE PRIMIN SAID FLATLY THAT U.S. FORCES IN KOREA WERE NOT CONTRARY TO THAT NATION'S NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION. HE REITERATED THAT IT IS JAPAN'S TASK TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

7. THE HEGEMONY ISSUE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THE PRIMIN SAID THERE COULD BE NO RETREAT FROM THE PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE 1972 JAPAN-CHINA COMMUNIQUE. PUSHED FOR A DEFINITION ON HEGEMONY, THE PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD NOT DEFINE IT AND CONSIDERED IT SIMPLY "ONE OF THE PEACE PRINCIPLES." THE FONMIN SAID THAT IF THE HEGEMONY PHRASING WERE IN THE PREAMBLE OF A JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP TREATY, IT WOULD REFER TO THE PAST AND CREATE NO FUTURE RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS. THE PRIMIN NOTED THAT AS A "PEACE PRINCIPLE" IT WOULD HAVE NO APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. IN LATER INTERPELLATIONS, THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT INTERPRETATION OF THE HEGEMONY CLAUSE IS THE ISSUE. IF IT IS CONSIDERED SIMPLY A UNIVERSAL PEACE PRINCIPLE, "THE WAY WOULD BE OPENED" (PRESUMABLY TO AGREEMENT ON THE TREATY). END UNCLASSIFIED.

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8. COMMENT. IN COPING WITH QUESTION REFLECTING A MARKEDLY INCREASED CONCERN WITH JAPAN'S SECURITY, THE PRIMIN AND FONMIN FACED AN UNCOMMONLY DIFFICULT TASKS. THEIR RESPONSE REFLECTED THEIR DESIRE TO BE UNABRASIVE TOWARD OPPOSITION PARTIES, WHOSE HELP IS NEEDED IF MIKI'S LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM IS TO FARE AT ALL WELL AND WHOSE QUESTION OFTEN REFLECT AT LEAST BASIC FEARS OF THE POPULACE. THEY ALSO HAD TO
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MOLLIFY TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE THE HAWKS WITHIN THE LDP, SOME OF WHOM WOULD SUGGEST THAT JAPAN SEND TROOPS TO KOREA. IN ADDITION, THERE WAS THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN CURRENT POLICY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SEEK TO GIVE SOME HINT OF A PERSONAL IMPRINT ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.

9. THREE ASPECTS OF THIS PORTION OF THE DEBATE SEEM WORTH NOTING. FIRST, WHEN PRESSED BY THE OPPOSITION FOR REASONS BEHIND THE COLLAPSE IN INDOCHINA, THE PRIMIN FOUND IT BOTH CONVENIENT AND RELATIVELY HARMLESS TO AGREE WITH THE OPPOSITION THAT THE WAR WAS LOST BECAUSE FORCES OF "NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION" WERE NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THIS DID NOT PREVENT HIM, HOWEVER, FROM INSISTING FLATLY THAT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION. SECOND, THE PRIMIN'S ASSERTION THAT PEACE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS ESSENTIAL TO JAPANESE SECURITY DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE 1969 NIXON-SATO COMMUNIQUE FORMULATION. THE REVISED WORDING STRIKES US AS MIKI'S ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS OF HAWKS AND DOVES ON THIS ISSUE WHILE PRESERVING SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER. WHETHER THIS WILL BE AN ENDURING FORMULATION REMAINS TO BE SEEN. WE WILL, OF COURSE, BE PROBING FOR GOJ POLICY INTENT IN THIS AREA INTENSIVELY. FINALLY, THE PRIMIN'S HANDLING OF THE "HEGEMONY" QUESTION IN BLAND UNIVERSAL TERMS AIMED AT NO PARTICULAR COUNTRY SEEMS THE LEAST CONTROVERSIAL WAY OF COPING WITH A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE TOPIC AT TIME WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ON HOW THE WORD IS TO BE TREATED IN SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY HAVE STALLED.

10. THE DEBATE ON THESE AND RELATED THEMES WILL CONTINUE UNTIL EARLY JULY IN THE DIET AND BEYOND IN THE MEDIA. WE WILL, OF COURSE, REPORT IT SALIENT FEATURES. IN THE MEANTIME, FURTHER QUICK ANALYSIS POSES THE DANGER OF BEING OVERTAKEN BY ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE PRINCIPALS THEMSELVES AS THEY SEEK TO ACHIEVE IMPORTANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL GOALS WHILE ALSO PERSERVERING IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE. FINALLY, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS SUMMARY IS, OF NECESSITY, BASED ON PRESS ACCOUNTS. NEITHER THE SPEAKERS NOR THE RECORDS ARE YET AVAILABLE FOR VERIFICATION.

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